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Abstract 
 
Delays in obtaining development approvals have been advanced as a major reason for 
shortages if not also increase in cost of housing.  This paper is the first systematic attempt to 
examine whether the apparently long period of time taken to obtaining statutory planning 
permissions by developers for major development projects under Comprehensive Development 
Area (CDA) zoning is due to Town Planning Board rejections or developers’ strategy to hoard 
land or improve building design.  Publicly available Town Planning Board data obtained from 
the Planning Department, property transaction records kept by the Land Registry, property 
market statistics released by the Rating and Valuation Department and macro-economic data 
from the Census and Statistics Department are used to find out the number of planning 
applications and time taken for a real estate project in a CDA zone involving residential 
components to start construction from the date of the first valid planning application as the 
means to ascertain if any delay in development was due to business innovation in building 
design to cater to sustainable development; or strategic behaviour to hoard land. 
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Introduction 
 
The actual time taken for private development to complete for any planning jurisdiction, not to 
mention international comparison, is a much wanting land use policy and commercial 
information.1  The time involved is often asserted based on personal experience or hearsay, 
exaggerated in directions depending on the ideological preferences of the commentator.  After 
all, the transaction costs of gathering reliable and publicly available information about such 
time are phenomenal.  However, a good can be found in the literature. In Houston, USA, it 
takes only 120 days to “purchase land, obtain all the permits, build and move in” (O'Toole 
2014: p.182).  Surely the high-rise “starchitecture” of 50-storey gated residential buildings in 
Hong Kong take at least one year to build, yet it would be alarming to find that in this 
metropolis famous for its nominally laissez faire economy, a development by a major developer 
may take over 15 years to complete.  The benchmark time for a Hong Kong high rise property 
development is three years, which is the norm for a development subject purely to a land lease 
(“Government Lease,” previously “Crown Lease”) or obtained through a government land 
auction of leasehold interests.   
 
This paper examines whether the apparently long period of time used in obtaining statutory 
planning permissions by developers for major development projects under Comprehensive 
Development Area zoning, which is almost synonymous with the zoning of a major real estate 
project subject to both a statutory zoning plan and the need to negotiate over a new lease rather 
than buying one in an auction, is due to Town Planning Board rejections or developers’ strategy 
to delay or improve building designs from the point of view of sustainable development driven 
by business innovations.  
 
Theoretical Background 
 
There is a growing body of knowledge on the effect of delays in development approvals and 
housing prices.  Normally, planning delays are associated with restrictions in housing supply 
(Cheshire et al. 2012, Ball 2011), which may, in turn, affect housing prices. 
 
In their work, Mayo and Sheppard (2001) studied how “randomness” on the part of 
development control influences housing supply.  Randomness is derived from developers’ 
uncertainties over whether the authorities would grant them planning permission or how much 
time would be needed for the permission to be obtained.  Gallent and Carmona (2004) also 
noted that the discretion of planning authorities in the decision-making process can contribute 
to planning delays.  Staley (1994) had the same view and an empirical question to address here 
is whether rejection by a planning authority is actually the main cause of a lengthy process of 
development for major residential projects. Accordingly, Mayo & Sheppard (2001) found that 
“stochastic” development control renders new housing supply more inelastic (also Cheshire et 
al. 2012).  Specific to delays, they found that: 
 
The supply of housing in the current period was shown to be adversely affected by an 
increase in the maximum possible planning delay, by a decrease in the minimum 
possible planning delay, or by an increase in the variance of possible planning delays 
(Mayo & Sheppard 2001: p.125). 
 
                                                 
1 In Malaysia, development approval time was about “one to two years” (Ting et al 2007: p.1). However, there 
was no information about how much time is taken after approval is obtained. 
However, although planning delays in themselves are not conceptually hard to measure, they 
are actually seldom measured.  But there are some good exceptions.  Delays are affected not 
just by the bureaucratic or administrative system itself, but also by the behaviors of the different 
actors involved (Monk & Whitehead 1999).  Among other factors, a lack of agreement 
between some planning agencies or between planners and developers over design and density 
standard issues can also further planning delays (Gallent & Carmona 2004).  It is not just a 
matter of measuring the length of time it takes for a single planning application to be processed, 
which can be controlled and limited by cut-off dates or penalties for lags, as one still has to 
consider the possibility of a series of applications for a single project.  In their study, Ball, 
Allmendinger, & Hughes (2009) measured the delay not per single application, but by project 
site.  They focused on sites done only in one year to lessen other elements that affected the 
granting of a planning permission, but they excluded pre-application negotiations to simplify 
their study.  Examining planning applications by project site is more useful for analysis because 
this considers multi-application projects that demonstrate, more directly, the effects of planning 
delays on a project’s implementation (Ball, Allmendinger, & Hughes 2009). 
 
Aside from the arduous task of identifying and gauging planning delays, it is harder to identify 
and measure the costs they cause (Keogh & Evans 1992).  There lies an interplay between the 
costs and benefits of the planning system that contributes to the complexity of estimating the 
consequent private cost to developers and social cost to the immediate environs (Keogh & 
Evans 1992).  Differences in perspective over planning delays are also evident.  For example, 
many builders see delays as problematic, while some planners see it as the “price of a 
democratic service” (Gallent & Carmona 2004). 
 
Amid this muddle in appreciation of planning delays and their costs, it is not just an issue of 
planners oppressing builders and developers.  Monk and Whitehead (1999) pointed out that 
“landowners can exploit any oligopolistic certainty created by the planning system to delay the 
release of their land until prices have risen in the face of rising demand for housing.”  
Intentional delays by builders or developers to gain some strategic advantage is not impossible.  
However, there has been no direct attempt to relate the delays to the possibility of voluntarily 
slowing down development to raise prices or institute environmental improvements.  In the 
footsteps of Ball (2011) and Ball, Allmendinger, & Hughes (2009), who dwelled on the 
applications of individual projects, this study tries to fill this research gap by systematically 
examining certain Hong Kong real estate developments. 
 
Social and Theoretical Background 
 
Delays in obtaining planning permissions as an important type of development approval other 
than building permissions and lease modifications have long been suspected of being and 
advanced as a reason for shortages in housing in Hong Kong, but this has never been verified 
by an in-depth investigation of the actual processing of individual applications.  The Lands 
Department announced a standard of about one year.  This paper is the first systematic attempt 
to examine whether the apparently long periods of time taken to obtain statutory planning 
permissions by developers for major development projects under Comprehensive Development 
Area (CDA) zoning were due to Town Planning Board (TPB) rejections or developers’ strategy 
to hoard land or improve building designs.  Unlike local councils in Western democracies, the 
TPB is not a democratically elected body, but a government-appointed body tasked with 
governing planning approvals for all of Hong Kong under the Town Planning Ordinance.  
Under Hong Kong’s leasehold system, a change in use approved by the TPB cannot proceed 
to an application for building approval if the use is not permitted by the land lease.  A 
modification of the lease and payment of a modification premium, a lengthy private negotiation 
process that takes about 350 days to complete for a normal case, is standard practice. (Lai et 
al. 2010) 
The justification for a statutory planning control system is to screen development proposals so 
that only those that do not negate the objectives of the statutory plans can be carried out by 
developers.  The screening is usually done by a board that comprises members (who are all 
appointed in the case of the Hong Kong) of the public who represent the public interest.  This 
institutional arrangement has attracted two complaints by pro-market theorists. 
The first complaint is that such a system would degenerate into a “planning game” that involves 
parties who are not concerned with the need for development, slows down or even frustrates 
development, and, therefore, increases the real cost of development and property prices (Staley 
1994).  The time it takes a developer to get development approval for its application is the main 
concern of the pro-market group. 
The second, and more sophisticated, criticism is that this system has become more elaborate in 
terms of requirements (concurrence of government departments, impact assessments, public 
information, consultation, participation, and objection) and tends to favour larger developers, 
as they are more resourceful in terms of financing and technical knowledge to endure the 
scrutiny by public opinion.  This would drive out smaller builders and create industrial 
concentration characterized by the presence of big developers. Consider this criticism of the 
land administration of lease modifications in Land and the Ruling Class in Hong Kong: 
Through the workings of the lease modification system, developer conglomerates that 
acquired utility or public service companies have been able to exploit land assets in 
those companies.  Idled utility sites or public bus depots have been converted into 
lucrative residential or commercial properties via using that system.  This brings out 
the question of social justice and efficient use of land, the single most valuable natural 
resource that Hong Kong possesses (Poon 2005: p.111). 
 
Poon’s idea promoted a kind of conspiracy theory of collusion between government officials 
and business.  This was put into proper perspective by the findings in a research project in 
relation to franchised public bus depots (Lai et al. 2013; Lai and Kwong 2015). 
Poon did not point out that in addition to taking over public utility companies with land 
holdings, these consortia have also acquired agricultural land in the New Territories with a 
view towards urban and suburban development.  As the typical formerly agricultural sites 
acquired by these developers are huge, they are usually zoned “Comprehensive Development 
Areas” (CDA) for better planning purposes. 
This paper explores a new angle of looking at the behavior of developers during development 
approval procedures by a planning board, the Town Planning Board (TPB) of Hong Kong, by 
investigating the phenomenon of repeatedly made fresh applications by developers whose 
applications have already been approved.  The de jure planning authority is the TPB, but the 
Director of Planning wields great influence within the Board. The theoretical interest lies in 
the fact that just as developers were found to have, by-and-large, voluntarily complied with 
planning conditions in the absence of statutory sanctions or even lease controls (Lai et al. 
2007a).  It may well be that developers were being innovative in making fresh applications in 
response to comments by the public and/or government departments.  On the other hand, they 
might have also voluntarily “delayed” their projects by fresh applications.  This articulates with 
the conjecture that developers engage in “rent-seeking” attempts by raising the entry costs of 
competition to deter rivals. 
Lai and Ho (2008) discovered an interesting phenomenon: developers who obtained TPB 
approvals for their projects often made new applications for the same sites.  From the 
perspectives of the planning officers involved in these fresh applications, they are attempts to 
“test the limits” of the planning, environmental, engineering, and other officers who advise the 
TPB.  From the government angle, this practice creates a lot of work for the planners and there 
has been a Bill to charge developers for planning applications, as in the case of building 
applications under the Buildings Ordinance.  This Bill has, hitherto, not been approved by the 
Legislative Council.  However, from the point of view of the applicant, this is a statutory right 
to achieve a higher value outcome.  From an economic perspective, this can be interpreted as 
either a profit-seeking “strategic behavior” or a genuine and socially beneficial knowledge 
discovery process, which takes time, to achieve a higher value outcome.  The former may be 
purely testing the limits or delaying development in time of uncertainty.  The latter, which is 
far more significant, involves innovations and qualitative changes to the proposals. 
This paper is the first systematic study on the nature and patterns of the repeat applications for 
private residential development within Comprehensive Development Area (CDA) Zones (Lai 
1996, 1998; Lai et al. 2007a, Lai et al. 2007b; Lai et al. 2009) with a view to verifying if 
developers innovate during the development control process by meeting the following 
objectives. 
In terms of development control research using non-aggregate data, this paper project is a new 
endeavour, as the extant literature is dominated by attempts to model the regulator’s behaviour 
(for instance, Tang and Tang (1999); Tang and Choy (2000), Tang, Choy and Wat (2000); 
Lai and Ho (2001a, b, c, d; 2002a, b, c; 2003); Chau and Lai (2004); and Lai et al. (2011)), 
rather than that of the regulated (except Lai et al. 2008). 
 
Theoretical and Public Policy Significance 
 
Theoretical Significance 
Capitalizing on the availability of non-aggregate development control data for statutory 
planning in Hong Kong, this paper is a novel approach to verify the conventional libertarian 
belief that a planning regime delays development.  Furthermore, it is the first attempt to 
investigate if development controls can stimulate innovations as a means to create new values 
under trial by a planning board.  Schumpeterian innovations are essential for sustainable 
development (Yu et al. 2000; Lai and Lorne 2003, 2006, 2015). 
 
Policy Significance 
This paper is of great policy significance, as it should provide much wanted information backed 
by reliable statistics to inform policymakers regarding the behaviour of developers under the 
present planning regime.  In particular, the question of if there really were attempts by 
developers to abuse the system, hitherto un-surveyed, can be properly addressed.  Besides, 
whether or not the “Hong Kong Model” of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
Government for sustainable development stresses economics, society, and the environment 
(Lai et al. 2006) can also be probed. 
 
This paper covers three basic areas of public policy and theoretical concern (Figure 1), namely 
developer’s strategy, business innovations in real estate, and statutory planning control. 
 
The first theoretical concern is economic: it concerns the strategic behaviour of developers that 
use their land banks, which pertains to such contentious policy issues as the social costs of 
suspected land hoarding. 
 
The second concern is the question of the possibility of sustainable development via business 
innovations, which transforms negative externalities into positive ones (Lai and Lorne 2006, 
2015). 
 
The third concern is the operation of the statutory planning system in rationing redevelopment 
rights, which, in the case of Hong Kong, means, on the one hand, an additional hurdle to 
redevelopment, according to a Crown/Government Lease, and, on the other hand, a possible 
means to promote sustainability via participation by stakeholders. 
 
The looming criticism of developers in relation to the use of land banks should not be taken 
into isolation but interpreted from a public policy development point of view of the wider 
constitutional context of post-colonial Hong Kong which is witnessing “rising public mistrust 
of the government and intensifying grassroots grievances” (Lau and Kuan 2000: p.1024).  It 
is hoped that our project would provide the public and policy makers a better informed picture 
of a key dimension of everyday life in Hong Kong – housing supply.(Lai and Ho 2008; Lai 
et al. 2010). 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
The local public policy significance of this project should be viewed in light of a certain kind 
of public opinion with a sentiment that is highly critical of developers as anti-social oligarchs 
controlling the economy and helping to drive up property prices.  It so happens that these 
developers are also members of consortia that hold key public utilities (with land assets for 
plants) protected by the government under legislation and franchised conditions.  Several 
opinion groups (such as “Myradio” and “Left 21”) have criticized the Town Planning Board 
for favouring large developers.  Their views were certainly conjectural, but there is a need to 
rigorously investigate how this relates to property development.  Partly this was evaluated in 
Lai et al. (2013) and Lai and Kwong (2015) in relation to bus depot allocations.  This paper 
will directly examine developers’ behaviour in one of the three major development application 
processes, statutory planning, in Hong Kong. 
 
The idea of unifying these concerns is sustainable innovation in real estate development.  The 
presence or absence of such innovation can be empirically determined by ascertaining if there 
is any actual sustainable innovation in real estate development projects as a consequence of 
public or departmental comments during the statutory planning process.  This idea is not hard 
to test, as all comments on planning applications by the public and members of the Town 
Planning Board and changes in planning proposals after 9 June 2005 (per Gazette Notice L.N. 
50 of 2005) can be inspected at the Planning Department. 
 
Institutional and Geographical Background 
 
Until the end of the Second World War, urban Hong Kong consisted essentially of Victoria 
City (from Kennedy Town to Wanchai), and Kowloon Peninsula north to Boundary Street.  
Most of the rest of Hong Kong Island, New Kowloon, and the New Territories were suburban 
or rural.  The CBD was then in Central.  Since the 1950s, the new town policy has decentralized 
the city’s population, even though the country parks (designated in the 1970s) have remained 
non-urban (Lai 1999)  
 
It is well-known that property prices in Hong Kong have been very high since the 1980s.  Many 
blame the government as a land monopoly for maintaining a high land price policy by 
restricting the supply of leasehold interests via auctioning. Researchers have found this as a 
means of indirect tax (Jao 1976) to keep direct tax as low as 15% for income and profit and 
for social redistribution (Lai 1984).  The housing situation, however, has been complicated: 
mMore than 50% of the population are housed by the state in well-planned and cheap public 
housing estates.  Land supply for new housing in Hong Kong has traditionally come from four 
sources: 
 
(a) reclamation from the sea; 
(b)  terracing of hills; 
(c)  redevelopment of leasehold land by developers; and 
(d)  the redevelopment of public housing estates by the state. 
 
Sources (a) and (b) are somewhat like “greenfield sites” controlled by the state, whereas (c) 
and (d) are “brownfield sites”.  Source (d) is not for private housing.  By tradition, Source (a) 
is the prime mover of land production for private and public development (Lai and Baker 
2014; Lai et al. 2014). 
 
Private development under Hong Kong’s leasehold land system must follow the land use and 
development parameters contractually agreed to between the state and the lessee by a civil 
contract in the form of a deed or “government lease” (Lai 1998; and Lai et al. 2010).  If the 
lessee wants to increase the rights or reduce some development restrictions, s/he must negotiate 
with the Lands Department for a “lease modification” and pay a modification premium.  
Statutory zoning imposed unilaterally by the state may enlarge, but usually attenuate/remove, 
the contractually agreed-upon rights under a government lease.  Zoning (as a matter of 
“development control”) restricts supply by adding an extra hurdle to development in case it 
attenuates the rights under the lease, who must win them back through a planning application, 
which is also an essential prelude to lease modification.  However, the real cause of high 
property prices (Chiu and Chau 2005) nowadays is a combination of strong demand by 
wealthy Mainland Chinese investors, which led to the announcement in 2012 of the 
protectionist policy “Hong Kong Property for Hong Kong People”2, and the post-colonial 
government’s neglect of “forward planning,” or the production of (a) and (b) with the demise 
of the Strategic Planning Unit (Lai et al. 2014).  The only source of new land supply for private 
housing is Source (c) and CDA zones in the New Territories are a major component of this 
source. 
 
A typical CDA project does not begin with the developer buying land from a government land 
auction, but through land acquisition from landowners.  Figure 2 compares the procedure of 
development from land purchase to occupation for a typical CDA project to that for a non-
CDA project, which requires planning permission. Lease modification is important if the use 
applied for, whether under CDA zoning or not in the statutory town plan, is not permitted by 
the government lease.  Generally, development on land purchased directly from the 
government requires no lease modification.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
 
 
 
Research Objectives and Hypothesis 
 
The general objective of this paper is to find out the number of planning applications and time 
taken for a real estate project involving residential components in a Comprehensive 
Development Area zone to start construction from the date of the first valid planning 
application as the means to ascertain if any delay in development was due to business 
innovation in building design to cater to sustainable development or strategic behaviour to 
hoard land.  The general objective was to achieve four information search exercises. 
 
S1: find out the exact number of planning applications involved for each CDA project before 
they started construction from the date of the first valid planning application made after 1 
January 1990 to 31 October 2014, with the effective date of the amendment to the Town 
Planning Ordinance (10 June 2005) falling in the middle; 
 
S2: find out the exact amount of time (in months) that involved all planning applications for a 
CDA project to start construction with all dates matching those in S1; 
 
S3: find out if the developer’s amendments to the planning proposals involved innovations for 
each CDA project to start construction with all dates matching those in S1; and 
 
S4: find out if the time taken by a developer to get final planning permission to commence 
construction was statistically related to the size of the proposed development site and/or the 
environmental condition of the district in question. 
 
The data for S1 and S2 were obtained from the Planning Department’s website, while those for 
S3 were obtained from its public enquiry service. 
 
                                                 
2  LCQ5: The "Hong Kong Property for Hong Kong People" policy. 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201406/11/P201406110675.htm 
The general refutable hypothesis for this fact finding exercise is that the TPB was the major 
cause of delays in residential CDA projects.  This hypothesis would be rejected if there is good 
evidence that developers tend to make fresh applications after they obtain planning permissions. 
 
Findings 
 
First, there were a total of 261 property development projects within CDA zones that included 
sites for residential use,3 for which the first planning applications were made before 10 June 
2005 and 94 projects for which first applications were made after 9 June 2005.  Of the former, 
only 65 were fully or partly-completed4  for residential purposes by 31 January 2015.  Table 1 
presents the key features of these 65 projects with their development names, lot numbers, and 
addresses suppressed5.  These features, which inform on the length of time expended in the 
planning application sequences, gross floor area, and gross site area, are pertinent to an 
adequate assessment of the impact of the projects on total housing supply. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Second, a simple linear regression test was conducted with the 65 fully or partially completed 
sites and it established that the correlation between the length of time and the size of a site was 
weak and insignificant.  Tables 2 and 3 show the results of the linear regression from the length 
of time between the first application and the Planning Department to the granting of the first 
Occupation Permit versus the Gross Site Area and Gross Floor Area, respectively.  Tables 4 
and 5 are similar to the previous two tables, but use the length of time from the first 
successfully approved planning application.  All four cases show that the length of time and 
the size of the sites are weakly-correlated.  That is, the size of the CDA site does not affect how 
long it would take to complete a project starting from the planning application stage. 
 
Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 about here 
 
Third, the exact amount of time (in months) that involved all planning applications for every 
CDA project that started construction from the date of the first valid planning application was 
identified.  Figure 3 presents a sample morphology of the planning applications of 7 of the 
lengthier completed projects. They generally did involve TPB frustrating the projects but a 
consecutive series of “conditional approvals” (indicated by the notation C) or unconditional 
approvals (A). Branching of application strings is also an interesting feature reflecting some 
strategic project management measure. All in all, the long time taken was not due to TPB 
standing in the way blocking development refusing to grant planning permissions but 
developers own reapplications.  
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
Fourth, a more rigorous test on the decision factors of TPB, non-aggregate planning statistics 
for all residential sites of the 261 CDA sites by a probit regression model established that a site 
in the New Territories (in contrast from Kowloon or Hong Kong Island) and a site situated in 
                                                 
3 Such uses as open storage and parking vehicles were excluded. 
4 Because of their irrelevance to the housing supply, sites with their first planning application 
before the Town Planning Ordinance Amendments on 10 June 2005 not partially or fully 
completed were excluded. 
5 For details statistical analysis, see Lai (etal 2015). 
an area with more developmental components (as a measure of development density if not also 
perceived marginal cost of development) was statistically less likely to get approved in the first 
instance of the first application.  Gross floor area was insignificant as a major consideration by 
the TPB for a first application. 
 
The model was used in similar studies of the TPB by Lai and Ho (2001a, b, c, d; 2002a, b; 
2003) and Chau and Lai (2004) using Equation (1) below. 
 
݌൫ݔఈଵ, ݔఈଶ, … , ݔఈ௝൯ ൌ ۴൫ߚ଴ ൅	ߚଵ	ݔఈଵ ൅ ⋯൅ ߚ௝ݔఈ௝൯ ൌ ଵ√ଶగ ׬ expሺ
ି௧మ
ଶ
ఉబାఉభ௫ഀభା⋯ାఉೕ௫ഀೕ
ିஶ ሻ݀ݐ (1) 
 
Or equivalently: 
 
۴െ૚ሾ݌൫ݔߙ1, ݔߙ2,… , ݔߙ݆൯ሿ ൌ ߚ0 ൅	ߚ1	ݔߙ1 ൅⋯൅ ߚ݆ݔߙ݆ (2) 
 
The probability of a successful first-instance planning application was modelled as a function 
of whether or not a site is in the New Territories, how high is the development density of the 
proposed project, and its proposed GFA.  xα1, x α2, . . . , x αj are the values taken by these 
variables for the αth first-instance planning application.  To estimate the parameters β0, β1, . . . , 
βj, the maximum likelihood method was applied. 
 
Only the cases of the very first-instance of application for each site were utilized because such 
applications were the most likely to display the above factors, which are also the most relevant 
during the Planning Department’s evaluation.  Moreover, the succeeding applications are 
normally general or partial updates of the previous ones.  For initially denied applications, the 
first succeeding instances in which they are approved were also included in the observation to 
see how the decisions were affected by any change in these factors, if applicable.  A total of 
163 applications were used. 
 
The statistical details of the tests are presented in Appendix 1.   
 
Fifth, there was no evidence of any major planning innovation involved in the proposals 
submitted in the fresh applications made after a planning permission was granted.  However, 
there was evidence of some gradual improvements in the landscape and building design.  The 
team inspected the earliest MLPs and their respective latest MLPs available for public 
inspection in the Planning Department. The actual architectural drawings and schedules of 
accommodation were then compared.  If a site had many sub-components or phases, the earliest 
and latest of a particular phase or sub-component were inspected.  Some sites only had one 
MLP deposited with the Planning Department, so no comparison could be made for these cases.  
Most changes in MLPs upon re-application were of minor design significance, which reflected 
changes in the market conditions (say, from larger flats to smaller flats or vice versa) rather 
than perceptible revisions in planning or design philosophy.  Among the major changes found 
in some fresh applications, part of the gross floor areas originally planned for office spaces or 
hotels in three cases were converted to residential in the later designs.  Also, for at least two 
sites the footprints and shapes of the buildings were reconfigured in subsequent MLPs.  As 
expected, the latter MLPs generally contained more details of the landscaping and recreational 
facilities.  It is worth noting that these few cases of larger changes were a relatively small 
fraction of the MLPs inspected and generally trended towards more superior designs. 
 
Sixth, there was no evidence that the time required for a lease modification was a major cause 
of a re-application.  Although the actual time taken to obtain a lease modification was secret, 
no rational developer applied for lease modification until planning permission for a site’s 
intended use was obtained.  The time gap between the first successful planning application and 
the execution of the lease modification document for each of the 65 cases was calculated.  The 
average time gap found was three years, which was longer than the norm for the Hong Kong 
real estate market, not to mention for the Lands Department’s service pledge to complete the 
process within one year.  
 
Seventh, as far as land supply is concerned, the number of private housing units generated by 
the (65) projects built amounted to less than 50% of all approved quantum, if not all CDA.  Had 
all the unbuilt CDA zone projects (whether pending or stopped) been used to develop 
housing—according to Hong Kong’s new town density planning standards of 2,300 persons 
per hectare, ignoring large site reduction factors, then as many as a million people could be 
housed. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Traditional libertarian analyses of development control typically criticizes the development 
control authority as the culprit for delays in development and escalations in housing costs.  This 
paper is original as the first in-depth empirical study of the morphology of development 
approvals and voluntary delays in the actual development of the development control process.  
The cases examined were major development projects controlled by government-approved 
master layout plans submitted by developers to the TPB.  While some marginal improvements 
to design were found among the resubmitted master layout plans, no significant trend of 
innovation was discerned and all adjustments by developers were due mainly to their responses 
to changing market conditions rather than to the size of the development project.  Significant 
delays were found.  Whether or not these were compensated by better-valued properties is a 
separate matter, but there is a prima facie case for policymakers to look into the phenomenon 
of repeatedly made fresh development applications though permissions have already been 
granted with a view to speeding up the development process.  The TPB was not the principal 
cause of delay as it did not appear that it was very difficult for developers to get planning 
permissions or even lease modifications. 
 
In this study we did not identify or disclose the developers of individual projects, though it is 
locally well-known that “the Big Four” would be involved.  Our study focused on the 
phenomenon of the strategic behaviour of developers and the need to speed up the development 
of CDAs rather than on who should take the blame for lengthy period of (if not delay in) 
development, although the Planning Department hardly escapes criticism for not being 
sensitive to or aware of the situation and, above all, for neglecting forward planning to produce 
new land for sale by reclamation.  
 
Note that as far as innovation was concerned, the focus was not on whether there was any 
innovation by a project, but whether the fresh MLPs reflected any major innovation.  We 
inspected and compared the publicly available MLPs of 65 built projects and found little 
evidence of great change.  
 
A factor that may explain the voluntary withholding of the exercise of the planning permissions 
by developers that is beyond the scope of this study is the transaction costs required to acquire 
titles of land under fragmented ownership.   The developers may very well start the process for 
obtaining development approvals while, jumping the gun, attempting to acquire all property 
titles to allow the commencement of the construction projects.  As they are still struggling in 
land assembly, they are compelled to make fresh MLP submissions to keep the planning 
permissions alive and take the opportunity fine tune the projects in response to market changes.  
This possibility is an area worth investigating. 
 
It is hoped that this paper, as a demonstration case study, would stimulate further and better 
inquiries into the strategic behaviour of developers that time their construction processes, 
which has social implications for housing.  We also hope that our work, constrained by 
resources, will kindle an interest in international comparisons of developers’ strategic 
behaviour and property rights constraints.   
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Appendix 1: Details of probit analysis 
 
Table 6 shows the statistical characteristics of the 3 decision variables “location” (whether 
New Territories or not) “gross floor area”, and “development density” of each application. 
Table 7 shows the results of the Probit model regression using Eviews8.  NT refers to whether 
or not the site was in the New Territories (1 if yes or 0 if not).  This distinguished whether or 
not it was more difficult for sites in more urbanized areas to get their first applications 
approved.  DEVDENS is the development density of the proposed CDA site.  This is the gross 
floor area over the site area.  LOGGFA is the logarithm of the proposed gross floor area. 
 
Tables 6 and 7 about here 
 
The results showed that only NT and DEVDENS had p<0.05, which were significant.  The 
positive sign in the coefficient of NT meant that a site in the New Territories (in contrast to 
Kowloon or Hong Kong Island) was more likely to be approved in the first instance of its first 
application.  On the other hand, the negative sign in the coefficient for DEVDENS meant that 
as more developments were proposed for a given unit site area, the greater their chances of 
rejection.  The results, with respect to the gross floor area, were not significant.  It seemed that 
it was not a major consideration for the first application. 
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Table 1 Features of completed CDA sites 
 
Sites 
Time 
from first 
applicati
on to 
date of 
OP 
(Months) 
Time from 
first 
successful 
application 
to date of 
OP 
(Months) 
Gross 
Floor 
Area 
(hectares)
Gross site 
area in 
first 
approved 
MLP 
(hectares)
Gross site 
area in 
last 
approved 
MLP 
(hectares) 
Number 
of flats in 
earlier 
approved 
MLP 
Number 
of flats in  
last 
approved 
MLP 
available 
1 209 188 5.03 1.66 1.63 772 822 
2 192 190 0.58 0.28 0.22 34 36 
3 181 181 20.39 3.90 3.60 2,368 2,600 
4 180 164 8.36 2.00 2.00 1,904 1,466 
5 178 169 4.13 10.32 1.00 297 265 
6 166 162 7.48 0.80 0.80 896 924 
7 166 163 11.76 18.37 18.37 1,819 1,860 
8 158 158 13.22 5.00 5.00 662 662 
9 157 157 12.45 2.40 2.37 1,776 1,720 
10 154 95 3.15 1.50 1.40 750 800 
11 153 153 10.34 1.00 1.00 1,748 1,748 
12 145 106 13.47 1.30 1.30 1,000 1,136 
13 137 100 18.06 3.80 3.80 1,248 1,576 
14 136 136 5.43 0.60 0.20 1,412 1,400 
15 136 136 9.12 0.80 0.80 N/A N/A 
16 135 135 0.77 1.29 1.34 50 87 
17 134 126 6.25 4.70 4.70 992 992 
18 133 129 8.72 3.82 3.84 1,216 1,264 
19 130 129 165.28 34.80 34.80 21,500 21,500 
20 126 124 9.07 1.80 1.80 1,240 981 
21 124 63 8.77 0.92 0.91 560 560 
22 124 99 6.45 0.40 0.40 N/A 576 
23 119 119 6.72 0.90 0.70 800 1,148 
24 115 106 2.62 0.30 0.30 342 420 
25 110 110 20.92 4.20 4.20 N/A 2,824 
26 107 95 31.64 12.70 12.70 3,800 4,000 
27 99 99 28.00 20.80 21.20 3,700 5,289 
28 98 98 85.44 22.50 N/A 10,716 12,464 
29 98 93 3.97 0.41 0.41 532 550 
30 95 72 4.98 4.50 4.30 4,040 4,130 
31 92 71 2.02 0.36 0.35 352 352 
32 91 91 8.18 0.86 0.86 624 658 
33 89 78 62.80 16.90 1.70 5,250 1,526 
34 87 81 1.76 0.59 0.59 139 126 
 23
35 87 87 6.68 2.20 2.20 1,099 2,356 
36 85 81 6.80 0.89 0.89 1,313 1,313 
37 83 83 1.83 0.60 0.60 312 320 
38 82 74 0.99 0.20 0.23 173 170 
39 80 80 4.97 0.72 0.72 856 792 
40 77 77 7.80 0.60 0.60 393 904 
41 75 70 25.39 5.00 5.00 NA NA 
42 75 75 0.90 0.45 0.45 70 82 
43 74 74 3.55 0.50 0.50 606 540 
44 73 72 3.55 0.40 0.40 600 600 
45 69 66 38.11 6.46 6.42 4,735 4,735 
46 68 68 7.01 0.60 0.60 1,320 1,320 
47 67 67 9.93 3.30 3.10 1,400 1,618 
48 65 65 12.61 4.20 4.20 1,248 1,624 
49 64 52 38.81 5.40 5.40 3,500 3,500 
50 62 64 2.47 0.30 0.30 384 402 
51 62 56 19.11 2.10 2.10 3,288 3,520 
52 60 58 7.25 4.16 4.16 604 604 
53 60 60 7.67 2.89 2.89 880 816 
54 60 59 2.04 0.20 0.20 344 400 
55 56 55 34.55 3.80 1.90 3,540 2,528 
56 55 55 23.44 4.60 5.30 2,558 3,302 
57 55 54 0.33 0.33 0.33 49 49 
58 52 52 2.78 0.40 0.40 300 300 
59 52 51 14.14 1.51 1.51 518 532 
60 52 48 2.24 1.56 1.73 68 128 
61 50 50 6.00 18.28 18.28 397 397 
62 48 47 0.11 1.20 1.20 1 1 
63 37 37 0.55 0.70 0.60 48 48 
64 33 30 8.83 3.60 3.60 700 700 
65 26 26 109.00 14.00 9.90 4,558 6,556 
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Table 2 Linear Regression Results of the Length of Time from the First 
Application to the First Occupation Permit vs Gross Site 
Area 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Length of Time from the First Application to the First 
Occupation Permit  
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 65   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
GSA 0.266545 0.842315 0.316443 0.7527
C 98.82098 6.562637 15.05812 0.0000
R-squared 0.001587 
Adjusted R-squared -0.014261 
F-statistic 0.100136 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.752712    
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Table 3 Linear Regression Results of the Length of Time from the First 
Application to the First Occupation Permit vs Gross Floor 
Area 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Time from the First Application to the First 
Occupation Permit 
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 65   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
GFA -0.104409 0.206726 -0.505058 0.6153 
C 101.5927 6.364518 15.96236 0.0000 
R-squared 0.004033  
Adjusted R-squared -0.011776  
F-statistic 0.255084  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.615280    
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Table 4 Linear Regression Results of the Length of Time from the First 
Successful 
Application to the First Occupation Permit vs Gross Site Area 
 
Dependent Variable: Time from the First Successful Application to 
the First Occupation Permit 
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 65   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
GSA 0.472241 0.794444 0.594430 0.5544 
C 91.34956 6.189670 14.75839 0.0000 
R-squared 0.005577  
Adjusted R-squared -0.010207  
F-statistic 0.353347  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.554353    
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Table 5  Linear Regression Results of the Length of Time from the First 
Successful Application to the First Occupation Permit vs Gross Floor Area 
 
Dependent Variable: Time from the First Successful Application to 
the First Occupation Permit 
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 65   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
GFA -0.064996 0.195592 -0.332303 0.7408 
C 94.38336 6.021732 15.67379 0.0000 
R-squared 0.001750  
Adjusted R-squared -0.014096  
F-statistic 0.110425  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.740764    
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Table 6 Data Description of the Independent Variables for Probit 
Analysis  
  DEVDENS  TOTALGFA 
  New Territories 
(NT) 
 Mean   104.62   135703.70     
 Median   5.04   75197.00  Number in NT   87 
 Maximum   16170.96   1652800.00 Number of non‐NT  76 
 Minimum   0.091752   195.0900     
 Std. Dev.   1266.19   205013.40    
         
 Observations   163   163     163 
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Table 7 Probit Estimates for CDA First‐Instance Applications 
Dependent Variable: IAPPROVED     
Method: ML ‐ Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Date: 08/26/15 
Time: 15:08     
Sample: 1 163       
Included observations: 163     
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations   
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
Variable  Coefficient Std. Error z‐Statistic Prob.   
NT  0.460962 0.205515 2.242965 0.0249 
DEVDENS  ‐0.000220 4.41E‐05 ‐4.991637 0.0000 
LOGGFA  0.230916 0.163579 1.411644 0.1581 
C  ‐1.569601 0.817055 ‐1.921048 0.0547 
McFadden R‐
squared  0.034175   
Obs with Dep=0  96     Total obs  163 
Obs with Dep=1  67      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
